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Abstract
A single failure in a communication network may trigger many alarms. When the com-
munication network uses optical bres as transmission medium and increases its capacity by
using Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM), the number of alarms and the diculty to
locate the failure are considerably higher. In this case, a single failure may interrupt several
channels which causes a large information loss.
We propose an Alarm Filtering Algorithm (AFA) for the fault management of an optical
network that supports multiple failures and works in the presence of passive elements, that
is, network elements which may fail but never generate an alarm (e.g. optical bres). The
algorithm provides a list of components whose failure explain the observed alarms. It avoids
the use of failure probabilities, which are dicult to estimate, and does not need a global
knowledge of the network topology. Moreover it also tolerates alarm losses and false alarms.
The algorithm is tailored to the specic behaviour of the hardware components of an optical
network when a failure occurs. The classication of the network components according to the
alarm signals they generate enables a formalisation of the alarm-ltering problem and results
in an ecient algorithm for localising the failure(s). This algorithm is applied to the WDM
rings of the COBNET network [1] (COBNET is a European ACTS project) and to a meshed
optical network with the ARPA2 topology.
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ltering, optical communication networks, fault diagnosis
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1 Introduction
Communication networks have been developing rapidly during the last few years. The evolution
of the transmission technology and the rapid increase in user needs have inuenced major changes
in networks. One new technology is the use of optical bre as transmission medium, which allows
high transmission rates because of their low attenuation and high capacity. The capabilities of
optical bre are increased by Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) that makes possible the
transmission of several information channels through a single link so that the capacity of the link
can become considerably higher. Nowadays, it is possible to nd market equipment that supports
from 80 to 128 wavelengths on a bre, each bre carrying up to 10 gigabits of information [2].
In a near future, this equipment may support up to one thousand wavelengths. But the capacity
advantage comes however with some drawbacks if a failure occurs. This rst one is that a failure
can now result in the loss of a large amount of information. The second one is that the manager
is overwhelmed by a large number of alarms because a single failure involves several channels. For
these reasons a fast fault recognition process is needed.
Fault recognition is the process of identifying failures from the alarms received by the manager.
The speed of this process is critical in ensuring network availability. It is composed of two phases:
alarm ltering and testing. The rst phase gives the list of network components that might have
failed and triggered the alarms received by the manager. The second phase conrms or discards
the previous result by checking these components. This testing part is outside the scope of this
paper, which is devoted to the alarm processing phase only.
The problem of identifying failures is closely related to the physical layer. Upper layers react
against physical failures in dierent ways but always try not to interrupt the communication (for
example, by rerouting or changing switch positions). But even if the connection is not lost, the
failure(s) has(have) to be localised. This is the role of the physical layer management. This
fault management should be based on the alarms emitted by the hardware and the knowledge of
the network component's behaviour. Nowadays, the physical layer is migrating from electronics
to optics and new kinds of network components are appearing on the market. Each component
behaves dierently when a failure occurs, and the information that is sent to the manager or that
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Figure 1: Example of single-hop architecture
the manager is able to retrieve is changing as well. This article considers the problem of localising
hardware failures at the optical layer, in particular in WDM networks.
Optical networks can be classied into two groups: single-hop and multi-hop networks [3]. In
single-hop networks, there is no conversion from optic to electrical signal during data transmission.
In this case, the transmitter and the receiver have to be set at the same wavelength (at least
one of them should be tunable) and the switches must be optical, as in the network shown in
Figure 1). In this example, the network is all-optical and the nodes have a transmitter (Tx) which
is xed to a certain wavelength and a receiver (Rx) tuned to the wavelength of the sender. The
interconnection is done via a passive star coupler [4]. Because the hardware technology has still
to evolve and improve, multi-hop networks are more expanded. These networks (for example the
one in Figure 2) use xed-wavelength transmitters and receivers. When a channel is established
between two nodes, it is the electro-optical switch at the WDM cross-connect node that converts
the signal at the sender's wavelength into an electrical signal and pack it back into an optical signal
at the receiver's wavelength.
In this paper we consider a multi-hop optical network using WDM techniques where several
channels are established. When a network element fails, all channels passing through this element
are interrupted. Consequently, all the elements that were involved in the interrupted channels and
that are able to send alarms to the manager will report him a problem. The messages from these
elements will be dierent and the manager will have to determine where the failure is. This is more
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Figure 2: Multi-hop WDM network with ring topology
complex when multiple failures occur almost simultaneously. In this case, alarms due to dierent
failures will reach the manager during the same period of time and they will intermingle. The
AFA can deal with the failure(s) of any component. As we will see later, to lter more alarms, we
will sometimes use the (reasonable) assumption that a number n of failures is more probable that
a number n+1 of failures.
Until now, we have only presented the ideal case, where all alarms are correctly generated
and received. The goal of the alarm ltering becomes more dicult to achieve under non ideal
conditions. Two abnormal cases can arise: existence of (1) missing alarms (alarms that do not
reach the manager) and (2) false or unexpected alarms. The rst case occurs when there are
alarms that are lost or that will arrive with such a delay that they cannot be considered during
the ongoing computation of the algorithm. The second case occurs when, due to an abnormal
situation, an element sends an alarm but there is no real failure. These alarms are not caused by
a malfunction but by an exceptional problem, as for example, an incorrectly measured value. To
handle these cases, a mismatch threshold will be introduced in Subsection 3.3.
Dierent methods have been proposed for alarm ltering in the literature. They dier on the
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network model that is used (e.g. model based on the physical topology [5] or on the description
of the established channels [6]; on the information needed (e. g. probabilities [7]) as input for the
algorithm; and on the information processing methodology to localise the failures (e. g. Finite
State Machine (FSM) [8] or Articial Neural Networks (ANN) [9]).
Our Alarm Filtering Algorithm (AFA) allows the location of multiple failures and the identi-
cation of failures in network components that are unable to communicate with the manager in the
non-ideal scenario which allows the existence of lost and false alarms. The input of the algorithm
is the list of established channels in the network and of the alarms received by the manager; the
network topology is not needed. The output of the algorithm is a list of network components that
may have failed.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 denes the taxonomy of the network elements
considered in this work. Section 3 formalises mathematically the problem dened above and
describes the AFA. Section 4 applies the AFA to dierent network topologies: a WDM meshed
network and a WDM ring network.
2 A classication of optical network components in terms
of their alarm processing properties
Walrand [10] denes communication networks as a set of nodes that are interconnected to allow
the exchange of information. In this case, the term node can refer to bridges, switches and access
ports. Such a denition is well suited for trac control but is not very helpful for fault management
because the view of the network is dierent. Fault management needs to know which are the
network components, what are the alarms and their content and in which situation these alarms
are sent. A new model of optical communication networks suited for fault management is therefore
needed and is presented in this section. This new model is based on channel relations between the
network components that may fail.
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Figure 3: Channel between two WDM rings
2.1 Channel Relation
As in all communication networks, channels are established between nodes that want to interchange
information. Channels can be unidirectional or bi-directional. In our model we will consider
channels to be unidirectional so that a bi-directional channel can always be considered as two
unidirectional channels.
As channels are unidirectional, they are ordered sets of network components. For example, the
channel presented in Figure 3 is an ordered set of 30 network components where the rst one is (0 1
1 0), the 14th one is (3 1 -2 1) and the last one is (0 2 2 0). The explanation about the component
identiers and their classication as P, A1, A2 and A3 elements will be given in Subsection 2.3.
2.2 Alarms
Alarms are messages sent to the manager by the components of a network informing of an abnormal
condition (e.g. some parameter of a component out of range, or a missing signal). As we will see in
detail in the next subsection, only the so-called active components can send alarms to the manager.
The content of these messages depend on the component [5] but always contains the identication
of the component that sent the alarm, the nature of the alarm, the abnormal value of the parameter
and/or the time when the alarm was sent (timestamp). The timestamp can be useful in localising
the failure but it can also lead to errors when there are multiple failures and has therefore not been
considered in our analysis. Our algorithm needs only the minimal amount of information present
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in all the alarms, that is, the alarm origin and its nature.
2.3 Network Elements
In this subsection we introduce the network components that usually belong to an optical network.
Based on their behaviour when a failure occurs, we have classied them into four dierent categories
which form the basis of the algorithm.
2.3.1 Hardware components of an optical network
The common hardware components that can be found in optical networks are:
 Optical bres: They are the medium for transmitting optical signals between two points.
The bres have a huge transmission capacity, low attenuation and low cost. One of their
advantages is that the same bres are able to transmit several information channels, each
channel being modulated at a dierent wavelength.
 Transmitters: In optical networks, transmitters are lasers or laser arrays that convert the
electrical signal into an optical one at a certain wavelength. The resolution of the laser limits
the spacing between the dierent wavelengths of the dierent channels, and hence the number
of channels in WDM networks. The new lasers used in advanced WDM networks are tunable
and can change the emission wavelength within a prescribed range [11].
Transmitters send alarms when either the temperature or the incoming power is beyond a
prescribed range. In fact, for each variable (temperature or power) there are two ranges (see
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Figure 4): the rst one, Ma, delimits the values for which the transmitter works correctly.
Once the upper or lower margin is crossed by either the incoming power or the temperature,
an alarm is sent informing that the corresponding variable is too high/too low, and hence
that the emitted signal may be incorrect. When the larger range Mt is exceeded, not only a
new alarm is sent but the transmitter is turned o to prevent it to cause any damage to the
network.
In the example of Figure 4, at time t
1
an alarm is sent informing that Ma is exceeded. Due
to local temperature or power control of the board, the value is back to the expected range
at t
2
and another alarm is sent to cancel the rst alarm. Some time later, at t
3
, Ma is again
exceeded and a new alarm is sent. At t
4
the range Mt is also exceeded, a new alarm is sent
and the transmitter is turned o (because the local control mechanism of the board has not
been able to restore the normal behaviour).
 Receivers: They convert an optical signal, which corresponds to a certain wavelength into an
electrical signal. Some receivers can only convert a xed wavelength, but tunable receivers are
able to change the wavelength within a given range. The latter ones have been developed for
advanced WDM networks, where wavelengths are reallocated (as in the example of Figure 1).
 Add-Drop Filters (ADFs): They are able to drop and add a certain wavelength to an optical
signal with several wavelengths without distorting the other wavelengths (see Figure 5).
These components are used in networks where each node has to retrieve the data addressed
to itself and modulated with its wavelength from a WDM signal. For example, in Figure 2, if
there is a connection established between WDM Node 1.1 and Node 1.2, they will send and
receive the information at respectively wavelengths 
1
and 
2
because their ADF will work at
these wavelengths. The WDM cross-connect node will associate the input 
1
to the output

2
and vice versa. In future optical networks, not only one but several wavelengths will be
added/dropped, making channel routing possible. This component is still under research and
it is called Add/Drop Multiplexer.
 3Rs (Re-generator/Re-shaper/Re-timing): These components are able to amplify the elec-
trical signal, give the original shape of the signal and readjust the time interval between
8
Add-Drop Filter InputOutput
Add Drop
λιλι
λ1...λn λ1...λn
Figure 5: Add/Drop Filter
pulses.
 Protection switches(PSs): These components receive more than one optical signal and select
one of them having an acceptable power level. The criterion to choose which input to take
depends on the switch implementation. For simplicity, the input to be chosen is given by
default and in case this input does not reach an acceptable power level, the switch changes
its position to take another input whose power is within the acceptable range.
 Multiplexers (MUXs) and Demultiplexers (DEMUXs): They are able to pass from several
optical signals at dierent wavelengths into one optical signal that contains all the wave-
lengths and vice versa. The MUX composes the WDM signal from several optical signals
and the DEMUX converts the WDM signal back into several single optical channels.
 Switches: These are the components that allow cross-connection, that is, the association of
a particular input with a particular output. In single-hop networks, they transfer an optical
input to an optical output without any electrical conversion. In multi-hop networks, the
switches are opto-electrical or electrical.
2.3.2 Properties
Network elements are the components of the network which may fail. Each network element has a
dierent behaviour when there is a failure. Three features can be distinguished:
1. Self-alarmed: This property species whether a network component is able to send an alarm
to the manager informing him about its own failure or not. The capacity of sending alarms
is related to the existence of a micro-controller, i.e. of some software that controls the board
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and communicates with the manager via a management protocol such as SNMP (Simple
Network Management Protocol) or CMIP (Common Management Information Protocol).
An example of a self-alarmed component is a transmitter. This component usually has a
micro-controller that controls its power and its temperature and sends alarms when the
functioning is not the regular one, that is, when these values exceed the allowed ranges, as
explained above.
If there is no micro-controller, it is not possible for the manager to be informed about the
hardware status. This is, for example, the case of an optical bre.
2. Out-alarmed: This property applies for the components that communicate with the man-
ager and send alarms about a problem external to them. For example, receivers are able to
detect that there is no incoming power and send the correspondent alarm to the manager
even if themselves are working correctly. On the contrary, multiplexers are not able to detect
if some inputs are missing or not, therefore they are not out-alarmed components.
3. Failure masking: This property species whether the network component masks or not
the failure to the components that follow it on the channel (remember that a channel is an
ordered set of components as explained in Section 2.1). The laser of a transmitter sends power
even if there is no incoming signal (due to a failure of some component located before the
laser). Therefore, any out-alarmed component located after this transmitter on the channel
will not send any alarm because it will keep receiving power, even if it does not receive data
any more.
We can now check which one(s) of these three properties applies to each kind of optical com-
ponent. This analysis is based on the capabilities of real optical components, in particular, on
the components of the COBNET optical network. The results of this analysis are summarised in
Table 1.
All the components have a micro-controller to communicate alarms to the manager, except
optical bres and (de)multiplexers, which are therefore unable to send any alarm in case of failure.
Components sending alarms about their own failures are the transmitters (once either the power
or the temperature is out of range), the ADFs (once they have an internal malfunctioning), the
10
Network Component Self-alarmed Out-alarmed Failure Masking Category
Optical Fiber No No No P
Transmitters Yes No Yes A3
Receivers No Yes No A2
Add/Drop Filters Yes No No A1
3R No Yes No A2
Protection Switch No Yes No A2
MUX/DEMUX No No No P
Switch Yes No No A1
Table 1: Alarm properties of the Optical Components and the resulting classication
switches (they inform about a problem such as the impossibility to connect a certain input with
a certain output). However, these components do not send any alarm if another component of
the same channel has failed. These components are therefore self-alarmed but not out-alarmed.
On the contrary, the remaining components listed in Subsection 2.3.1 are out-alarmed but not
self-alarmed: receivers and 3Rs (they send alarm whenever the received incoming power is below
a certain level) and protection switches (their alarm informs about a change of the switch position
towards a better quality input due to the degradation of the default input). Finally, as we have
seen above, a transmitter masks a failure that damaged a component located before it on the
channel, to all the other components following the transmitter on the channel, but it is the only
component to do so.
2.3.3 Network Components Classication
The properties of Table 1 enable us to classify all optical components in the following categories :
1. Passive components: These are the components that do not give any information to the
manager because they do not have any micro-controller.
2. Active components: These are the components that are able to communicate with the
manager because they have a micro-controller. Within this group there are three kinds of
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active components:
(a) A1 components: these are the self-alarmed components that do not mask the failures.
(b) A2 components: these are the out-alarmed components.
(c) A3 components: these are the components that are self-alarmed and mask previous
failures.
In this way, all the optical components have been classied as presented in the last column of
Table 1.
In Figures 3 and 6, we use dierent geometric forms to identify the dierent classes of com-
ponents. We use circles for the passive components, squares for A1 components, triangles for A2
elements and pentagons for A3 components.
Note that in this classication, based on the actual behaviour of hardware components in
networks such as the COBNET WDM network, there is no element which is at the same time
self-alarmed and out-alarmed. This is however not a restriction for the alarm ltering algorithm
described in Section 3. Indeed, whenever an optical component has both, the A1 (or A3 ) and A2
properties, it can be represented by a pair of elements: one A1 (or A3 ) and one A2. For example,
if a receiver is able to send alarms when it does not receive optical power and/or when it has an
internal problem, it is self-alarmed and out-alarmed. In this case, the receiver will be considered
as a set of two elements, one belonging to A1 category and the second belonging to A2 category.
Figure 6(a) presents the case when Receiver1 is only out-alarmed and Figure 6(b) presents the
case when Receiver1 is self and out-alarmed.
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3 Problem abstraction
The classication of Section 2 enables us to derive and implement the Alarm Filtering Algorithm
(AFA). Before describing the AFA itself, we rst need the following denitions.
3.1 Classes
Three dierent classes have been dened:
 Component e is a network component, which is either passive or active (see Section 2). Its
identier is a set of integers that indicate the location and the component type (this identier
is the one used in COBNET project). In our scenarios we have considered 4 integers to
identify all the components in a unique manner. The rst integer always gives the class
of component: 0 for passive components, 1 for an A1 class active component, 2 for an A2
class active component and 3 for an A3 class active component. The other integers give the
location of the component within the network topology and are specic to this topology (see
Section 4 for further explanation on particular networks)
 Channel c is dened as an ordered list of components fe
i
g.
 Alarm a is a pair (origin; information) where a.origin is an active component and a.information
is an integer that expresses the nature of alarm.
We now dene the sets that will be used throughout this article. The set of all network components
is denoted by NC, the set of established channels in the network by C and the set of alarms that
the manager receives by R. Moreover, let P be the set of passive components, A
1
be the set of
active self-alarmed components of A1 class, A
2
be the set of active components that send alarms
due to external failures, and A
3
be the set of active self-alarmed components of A3 class.
3.2 Functions
The two following functions will be used in the dierent AFA modules:
 As channels are ordered list of network components, one can dene the position of a compo-
nent e in a channel c, Pos(e,c), as the index of its occurrence in the ordered list. If e is not
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present in the channel Pos(e,c) returns 0. In other words,
Pos(e; c) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
0 if 8 e
i
2 c; e
i
6= e
i if 9 e
i
2 c; e
i
= e
(1)
 Component e
1
has a PassivePath with Component e
2
when there exists at least one channel
that contains both components and such that all components between them are of class P
or A1. Mathematically this can be expressed by the boolean relation:
e
1
e
2
=
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
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1 if 9c 2 Csuch that
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
1  Pos(e
1
; c)  Pos(e
2
; c) and
8e 2 NC with Pos(e
1
; c) < Pos(e; c) < Pos(e
2
; c); e 2 P [ A
1
0 otherwise
(2)
3.3 Alarm Filtering Algorithm scheme
The AFA has as inputs the established channels in the network C = fc
j
g and the received alarms
by the manager R = fa
i
g. These inputs are updated whenever a new event occurs: either a
channel event, which updates C, or an alarm event, which updates R. By channel event we mean
a modication of the set of established channels by the addition or deletion of a channel or by a
change of some components involved in a channel. By alarm event we assume the of a new alarm
arrival to the manager. The two kinds of events are independent.
The AFA has to deal with erroneous alarms, that is, false and missing alarms. The number
of erroneous alarms is the mismatching value. There is therefore an additional input set a priori
by the Human Manager: a mismatch threshold, denoted by m, which is an upper bound on the
number of erroneous alarms (that is, false or missing alarms that are tolerated). m=0 corresponds
to an ideal scenario where all the alarms are supposed to be correctly received. Depending on the
status of the network, the manager can therefore choose a low value of m (which results in a small
list of possible faulty elements but may miss a failure in case of corrupted alarms) or a large value
of m (which yields a broader list of faulty elements but has more robustness against false and lost
alarms).
The output of the algorithm is a list of dierent sets of network components that may be faulty
and that are an explanation of the observed symptoms with up to m erroneous alarms.
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The AFA is structured in 6 modules, as shown in Figure 7, which are as follows:
1. Rec Channel : The input of this module is the set of channels presently established in the
network whose set is denoted by C. This procedure delivers an updated set of ordered lists
of network components (denoted by CH ) that represent all the established channels after
the latest channel event, and some of the channels before this event. This module is called
every time there is a channel event, that is, in any of these three cases: (i) when a new
channel is established, (ii) when a channel is cleared down or (iii) when there is a change of
the components that belong to the channel. An example of case (iii) occurs when due to a
failure, the position of the protection switch is changed due to a failure. In this case, some
network components stop participating in that channel and new ones start doing so.
This module performs dierently for each of these cases. For case (i), it adds the ordered list
of network components making the new channel to CH. In case (ii), it removes from CH the
ordered list associated to the removed channel. For the last case (iii), it adds the ordered list
related to the new path of the channel, as if it was a newly established channel, and it keeps
the ordered list associated to the old path during a certain time. The reason of keeping the
old path is to allow the AFA to localise failures that happened before the path adjustment
(for example, the one that caused the change of the protection switch).
2. Alarm Discarding 1 :This module is the rst alarm discarding phase of the algorithm. It
produces a subset T of alarms from the received alarms R, which contains the alarms having
passed successfully the sequence of the three following tests, as shown in Figure 8:
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(a) The alarm must be sent by a component belonging to one channel c2CH. If this is
not the case, the alarm is discarded because it has been generated by transient values
reached by the network variables during the establishment of a channel.
(b) If the new alarm is consequence of an already known failure is discarded because it is a
delayed alarm.
(c) Is the alarm sent by a A1 or A3 component? If it is not the case, it will be added
to T. Otherwise, the alarm is forwarded to the Graphical User Interface (GUI) to be
presented to the Human Manager and included in the set PC
1
, which is input of the
Candidate Selection module, so that the origin of the alarm is considered a likely faulty
component:
PC
1
= fe 2 NC j9c 2 CHwith Pos(e; c) 6= 0 and 9a 2 R with e = a:origing (3)
The Alarm Discarding 1 procedure is called each time a new event occurs. If the new event
is a channel event, all the alarms R have to succeed the three sequential tests with the new
set CH. If the new event is an alarm event, the sequential conditions must be succeeded only
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by the new alarm in order for this one not to be ltered out as the other alarms are not
changed.
3. Alarm Discarding 2 : This module is the second discarding phase. It has as input T,
the reduced set of received alarms obtained after Alarm Discarding 1. Note that the set
T contains only alarms originated by A2 elements that belong to CH and are not the
consequence of a known failure.
Some of these alarms can be discarded thanks to the assumption that a number of n failures is
always more likely than n+1 multiple failures. Indeed, consider two contiguous out-alarmed
elements e
1
and e
2
belonging to a channel c (i.e. Pos(e
1
,c)+1= Pos(e
2
,c)). Suppose that
an element e, with Pos(e,c)< Pos(e
1
,c) fails. If there is no A3 element between e and e
1
,
both out-alarmed elements e
1
and e
2
send an alarm. We can disregard the alarm from e
2
because it does not give more information about the failure than the alarm from e
1
. Indeed
e
1
is closer to the failure than e
2
. The same principle makes us discard the alarm sent by e
2
when these two out-alarmed elements are not contiguous but have P and A1 between them.
Consequently, when several alarms issued by out-alarmed elements having only P and A1
elements between them are received, only the one whose origin has the smallest position in
the channel will be retained.
Let us illustrate on the channel example of Figure 9. If c fails, the components that will send
alarms are d and g. In this case, the alarm from g will be discarded by the alarm from d.
However, if for example f also fails, it will not be detected, only the failure from c will be
localized. It is only once c is repaired, that as explained above, a failure in f can be detected.
This situation of a double failure is assumed much less likely than a single one, and hence
are preferred to discard the alarm from g which most probably is redundant.
This second discarding phase results in a set of non redundant alarms issued by out-alarmed
17
elements denoted by ANR and dened by:
ANR = fa 2 T ja:origin 2 A
2
and for all a
0
2 T; a
0
:origin  a:origin = 0g (4)
4. Candidate Search : After having obtained the set of non redundant alarms ANR from
out-alarmed elements, one searches for the network components of CH whose failure may
have prompted these alarms, called fault candidates. Their set, PC
2
, may contain elements
of all the categories.
An element e is fault candidate of an alarm a, when e may have caused a, that is, when the
origin of the alarm is an A2 component and has a PassivePath with e. Mathematically it
can be expressed by
PC
2
= fe 2 NC j9c 2 CH with Pos(e; c) 6= 0 and 9a 2 ANR with e  a:origin = 1g (5)
At this point, we have obtained the set PC=PC
1
[ PC
2
containing all the components whose
likely failures account for the observed alarms (either A1 and A3 alarms, sent by elements in
PC
1
, or A2 alarms, sent because a failure of an element in PC ). The nal result, presented to the
Human Manager is not the whole set of elements PC but a renement of this set (which is denoted
by SC and is a set of PC subsets), for two reasons:
(i) In the ideal scenario where there are neither false nor lost alarms (m=0), one looks for the
smallest subsets of elements of PC that explain all the received alarmsR. One begins therefore
with singletons: all those which account for all the alarms in R are included in SC. If none
of them qualies, pairs of elements of PC are then examined, and so on, until a subset of
sucient size explaining all the received alarms has been found. Then, all the subsets of that
size that explain all the received alarms R are included in SC.
Let us consider the example of the channel presented at Figure 9. If there are only two
received alarms and if they are issued by d and g, the elements included in PC
2
after the two
discarding and the Candidate Search modules will be a, b and c. Therefore, since there is no
alarm issued by a self-alarmed element, PC = PC
1
[ PC
2
= ; [ fa; b; cg = fa; b; cg. As the
failure of only one of these elements is considered much more likely than the simultaneous
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Figure 10: Double channel example
failure of two or three of them, while yielding the same alarms from d and g, the singletons
fag, fbg, fcg have to be rst examined. In this case, singletons fag and fcg satisfy the
condition because they explain alarms issued by d and g. On the contrary, singleton fbg does
not fulll this condition because if it had failed, one would have had PC
1
=fbg. Therefore,
SC = ffag; fcgg.
Let us now consider the channels of Figure 10. Because a double failure, the only received
alarms are issued by d and g. This scenario will cause that not only a, b and c are included
in PC
2
but also e and f. As no singleton an explain both received alarms, pairs of the
elements of PC
2
are then considered, so that PC = PC
2
= fa; b; c; e; fg and clearly, SC =
ffa; fg; fc; fgg.
(ii) If m > 0, another task will be performed by the two last modules, in addition to (i). In this
scenario, the set SC will contain all subsets of elements of PC which yield a mismatching
value less than or equal to m.
In the example of Figure 9, if the only received alarms come from d and g, PC = fa; b; cg.
Assume that m=1, that is, one mismatching between the received alarms and the expected
alarms is tolerated. Apart from the singletons fag, fcg that result in perfect matching, as we
have seen in (i), singleton fbg is also included in SC because when it is faulty, not only alarms
from d and g are expected but one from b itself. This scenario results in one mismatching
that is within the mismatch threshold given. The resulting SC will be SC = ffag; fbg; fcgg.
5. Domain Calc: This module is called every time CH changes. It computes, for each element
of each channel belonging to CH, the set of active components that would send alarms if
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this element fails. This set is called Domain(e
0
), for a given e
0
that belongs to CH. The
components that belong to Domain are e
0
itself if it has the self-alarmed property and the
out-alarmed components located after e
0
in the channel but without any A3 component
between themselves and e
0
. For example, consider the channel of Figure 6(a). If Optical
Fibre1 fails, Receiver2 will not detect the failure because Transmitter is still sending optical
power (even if it does not have any incoming data to modulate). In this case, Domain(Optical
Fibre1)=fReceiver1 , 3R 1g because Receiver1 and 3R 1 are the two network components
sending an alarm when Optical Fibre1 fails.
Mathematically, Domain (e
0
) can be expressed by:
Domain(e
0
) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
e 2 A
2
j 8c 2 CH; 1  Pos(e
0
; c)  Pos(e; c) and
8e
0
2 NC with Pos(e
0
; c)  Pos(e
0
; c)  Pos(e; c); e
0
=2 A
3
9
>
>
=
>
>
;
(6)
D stores the list of the Domain of all the components that belong to each channel of the set
CH.
6. Candidate Selection : This routine is called repeatedly as long as there is no updating of
the entries. The inputs of this process are the mismatch threshold m, the output PC
2
of
Candidate Search and the output PC
1
of Alarm Discarding 1.
Let us dene R
orig
as the set of components that are the origins of the received alarms R:
R
orig
= fe 2 NC j9a 2 R with a:origin = eg (7)
(i) In the ideal scenario, there are no lost or false alarms, so the manager can choose m=0.
The output SC is the set of subsets of elements whose failure will cause the same alarms
as the ones received by the manager.
Let P = fe
1
; e
2
; :::; e
n
g be any subset of n elements belonging to PC and whose domains
form a partition of R
orig
, that is, those domains verify equations (8) and (9).
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Rorig
=
n
[
i=1
Domain(e
i
) (8)
Domain(e
i
) \Domain(e
j
) = ; for 1  i 6= j  n (9)
In this case, the output SC is the set of all subsets P for all possible values of n.
(ii) In the non ideal scenario, the output SC is the set of subsets of elements that when failing
will cause a set of alarms which will dier from the received alarms by a mismatching
value lower than the given threshold m.
Let Q = fe
1
; e
2
; :::; e
n
g be any subset of elements belonging to PC whose domains are
disjoint (i.e. verify (9)) and such that:
#

(UnionDom(Q) nR
orig
)
[
(R
orig
nUnionDom(Q))

 m (10)
where # denotes cardinality and where UnionDom(Q) =
S
n
i=1
Domain(e
i
).
Then UnionDom(Q) nR
orig
is the set of components which should have sent an alarm
due to the failure of the SC components but whose alarms did not reach the manager
(i.e. lost alarms) whereas R
orig
nUnionDom(Q) is the set of components having sent
an alarm but which cannot be explained by the failure of the SC components (i.e. false
alarms).
In this case, the output SC is the set of all subsets Q for all possible values n.
Clearly, if m=0, (10) becomes (8).
3.4 AFA Result
The algorithm described in Section 3.3, has been implemented in Java. The algorithm inputs
(channels and alarms) can be given either via le (from the management application) or via Input
Frame (for testing purposes). The mismatch threshold m is asked to the manager at the beginning
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of the management session. As explained above, the subsets of possible failures, which are presented
to the Human Manager, form the set SC such that the mismatching value is lower than m. This
parameter will depend on the network size and on how accurate the Human Manager wants the
alarm diagnosis, where the lower m is, the less mismatching allowed. There is a compromise
between the desired accuracy and the probability of losing an alarm or receiving false ones.
The output of the algorithm is presented in an Output Frame.It has three windows: the rst
one gives the number of received alarms, the second one presents SC (that is, each subset Q) and
the third one gives, for each of the subsets, the mismatching value.
4 Examples
The AFA is applied on two dierent network topologies. The rst network has a meshed topology,
the ARPA2 topology and its nodes are either local nodes (the ones with ADF) or central nodes (the
ones with switches). The second network has two protected WDM rings interconnected through
the main node of each ring, which is the only node having a switch. The results of the AFA are
shown in dierent scenarios: single failures, double failures and for some missing and false alarms.
We will see the location of the failure is more exact when more channels are established due to
the fact that the information that the manager receives is larger. In some cases, the AFA presents
several components as possible failures because none of them is a better candidate than the others.
In this case, the possible existence of another parameter (as for example, the failure history of the
component or how old is it) may help to rene the list of faulty candidates.
Two of the most usual failures at the physical layer are the following:
1. Optical bre failures: The optical bres are installed underground and they can suer from
cuts due, for example, to animals or earth movements. In case a bre is broken, all the
channels that were transmitted through it are interrupted and all the receivers, protection
switches and 3Rs related to the interrupted channels and located after the failure will send
alarms to the manager. In case a ribbon is broken, channels in both directions will be
interrupted thus the number of alarms will be higher and more dispersed.
2. Wavelength instability: The stability of the emitted wavelength is an important parameter
22
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Figure 11: ARPA2 Network with optical links
because it is the one that guarantees controlled levels of crosstalk and distortion. For example,
if the temperature of the laser is too high, the emitted wavelength may be shifted. If the link
is using optical ampliers or if the signal is passing through add/drop lters, because they
do not have a at gain, this wavelength may get less amplied than the other wavelengths.
Due to this problem, the optical power at the associated receiver may be under the threshold
and an alarm informing about a missing optical signal will be send to the manager.
4.1 Meshed optical network with ARPA2 topology
ARPA2 is a well-known meshed topology that is going to be considered as the topology of the
studied optical network(see Figure 11).
We will consider this network as a multi-hop network so that each node uses a dierent wave-
length and that all the connections are bi-directional. Due to this bidirectionality, the information
addressed to a certain node can reach it from at least two dierent paths and the protection switch
will choose the best input among all. There are two kinds of nodes: local nodes and central nodes.
The former ones are the nodes that have an ADF and the latter ones are the nodes with a switch
(contrary to local nodes, central nodes have more than two connected nodes). In the example of
Figure 11, Nodes 1, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 are local nodes (marked with a
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Figure 12: Local Node Internal structure (a) and its modelization (b)
single circle) and Nodes 2, 3, 6, 8, 13, 15 and 16 are central nodes (represented by a double circle).
Each kind of node has a dierent internal structure hence its modelization results to be dierent.
During the modelization, each element is associated to a four digits identier that is unique in the
network and helps to a fast localization within the network.
Figure 12(a) presents the internal structure of a local node and Figure 12(b) presents its modeliza-
tion. Each element has its identiers in accordance with Table 2 where the rst digit gives the
class of element, according to Section 2.3.3, the second digit x is the node identier, the third digit
is 0 and the fourth one determines the element within the node.
On the other hand, Figure 13(a) shows the components of a central node where k is the number of
nodes connected to it. Figure 13(b) presents its modelization. The element identiers have been
assigned in accordance with Table 3 where the rst digit gives the class of element, the second
digit x is the node identier and the combination of digits third and fourth is the identication of
the component within the node.
For this example, six channels have been established (Table 4).
The routing of the channels has been done arbitrarily and does not enter within the scope of
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Figure 13: Central Node Internal structure (a) and its modelization (b)
Component Identier
ADF CW node x 1 x 0 1
ADF CCW node x 1 x 0 2
Rx CW node x 2 x 0 1
Rx CCW node x 2 x 0 2
PS node x 2 x 0 3
3R CW node x 2 x 0 4
3R CCW node x 2 x 0 5
Local Access Port node x 0 x 0 0
Laser CW node x 3 x 0 5
Laser CCW node x 3 x 0 6
Table 2: Identiers of a local node hardware components
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Component Identier
MUX node x 0 x 1 0
DEMUX node x from node y 0 x 0 y + 1
PS node x at wavelength 
z
2 x z 1
3R node x at wavelength 
z
2 x z 3
Rx node x at wavelength 
z
2 x z 2
Switch node x 1 x 0 1
Local Access Port node x 0 x 0 0
Laser node x at wavelength 
z
3 x 0 z
Table 3: Identiers of the central node hardware components
Channel Input Node Output Node Intermediate Nodes
Ch #1 2 18 2-8-10-15-16-18
Ch #2 12 20 12-13-14-15-16-18-20
Ch #3 3 21 3-6-11-16-18-20-21
Ch #4 1 14 1-2-8-9-12-13-14
Ch #5 8 15 8-10-15
Ch #6 11 17 11-16-15-14-13-17
Table 4: Established channels
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this paper. The input C to the AFA (presented in Appendix) is the ordered list of components of
each channel. For example, the ordered list related to Ch #1 is:
Ch #1: (0 2 0 0)(1 2 0 1)(3 2 0 18)(0 2 1 0)(0 0 2 8)(0 8 0 2)(2 8 18 1)(2 8 18 2)(2 8 18 3)(1
8 0 1)(3 8 0 18) (0 8 1 0)(0 0 8 10)(1 10 0 1)(0 0 10 15)(0 15 0 10)(2 15 18 1)(2 15 18 2)(2 15 18
3)(1 15 0 1)(3 15 0 18)(0 15 1 0) (0 0 15 16)(0 16 0 15)(2 16 18 1)(2 16 18 2)(2 16 18 3)(1 16 0
1)(3 16 0 18)(0 16 1 0)(0 0 16 18)(1 18 0 1) (2 18 0 1)(2 18 0 4)(2 18 0 3)(0 18 0 0)
Several failure scenarios have been tested with this conguration. The results are presented in
Table 5.
Failure of an optical bre : In Scenario 1 we have considered the failure of an optical bre,
as described in the beginning of this Section. In this scenario the problem is the failure of
the optical bre that connects Node 16 with Node 18 which is identied by (0 0 16 18). In
this case, three channels are interrupted: Ch #1, #2 and #3. Therefore, the components
that will send an alarm are the A2 components located after the failure and without any
A3 component between the failure and themselves. These components are: (2 18 0 1)(2 18
0 4)(2 18 0 3)(2 20 0 1)(2 20 0 4)(2 20 0 3)(2 21 0 1)(2 21 0 4)(2 21 0 3), that is, the three
Protection Switches, 3Rs and Receivers at respectively Nodes 18, 20 and 21. The solution
of the AFA having m=0, is either MUX (0 16 1 0)or Optical Fibre (0 0 16 18). The AFA
is not able to distinguish which of these adjoint passive elements has failed because any of
them provide information to the manager. In this case, as well as in all the next scenarios
that have alarms from Protection Switches, there are channel events that are considered in
the Rec Channel module. The agent that controls the hardware components, informs to the
manager that the Protection Switch has changed its position so that the channel path should
be updated. In this case, CH changes. For example, for Ch #1, the channel path will pass
by Nodes 2, 8, 9, 12, 13, 17, 19, 21, 20 and 18. This is one possibility that will depend on the
channel routing applyied and is outside the scope of this paper. When teh Protection Switch
changes its position, both paths are stored so that the failure that provoqued this switch can
be located given teh previous path. After localizing the failure, the path is removed from
CH.
27
Scenario no. of alarms Involved channels Alarm reduction Results
Scenario 1 8 Ch #1,Ch #2,Ch #3 62% MUX(0 16 1 0)(m=0)
O. F.(0 0 16 18)(m=0)
Scenario 2 4 Ch #3 50% Laser(3 6 0 21)(m=0)
Scenario 2' 3 Ch #3 66% Laser(3 6 0 21)(m=1)
Scenario 3 9 Ch #2,Ch #4,Ch #6 66% O. F.s (0 0 13 14)& (0
0 14 13)(m=0)
Table 5: Testing results
Laser wavelength instability In Scenario 2, the failure case of Subsection 2.4.2 has been consid-
ered. The laser at Node 6 that emits at wavelength 
16
has a problem. If the micro-controller
detects any anomaly at the laser, as for example the temperature out of the Ma range, it will
send an alarm. Because this alarm is sent by an A3 component, this alarm will be processed
by the Alarm Discarding 1 module and the origin of the problem will be perfectly localised.
But if the micro-controller of the laser does not detect any anomaly, no alarm is sent. In
this case, the resulting alarms from this problem are processed in the Alarm Discarding 2
module. These alarms are sent by the A2 components that after demultiplexing the WDM
signal detect the levels of each of the demultiplexed signals. In this case the alarms are
coming from (2 16 21 1)(2 16 21 2)(2 16 21 3). The result of the algorithm in this case will be
also the correct one but, with the mismatching value to 1 because the alarm from the laser
was expected and was lost.
Two simultaneous failures In Scenario 3, two simultaneous failures have been considered: the
two optical bres between Node 13 and 14 fail: (0 0 13 14) and (0 0 14 13). This is the case
when an optical ribbon is broken. In this case 3 channels are interrupted. Ch #2 and #4
use the bre from Node 13 to Node 14 and Ch #6 uses the optical bre from Node 14 to
Node 13. The algorithm localises the failure perfectly.
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Figure 14: The COBNET network with two nodes at each protected ring
4.2 A WDM ring network: COBNET
This Alarm Filtering Algorithm is applied in the COBNET Project [1]. The scope of the project
is to interconnect, through the Public Network (PN), Corporate Premises Networks (CPNs) us-
ing new photonic technologies with multichannel transmission that are realized with space- and
wavelength-division multiplexing (SDM and WDM) techniques (see Figure 14 where two CPNs are
connected through the PN).
CPNs are composed of:
 an interface to the PN called Public Interface Unit (PIU),
 a central node called High End Node (HEN) that contains the main switch. The inter-
nal structure of this node is presented in Figure 15(a). This switch interconnects inputs
from/outputs to any ring, its own local ports and the ports to/from the PN that are located
at the PIU,
 2 rings: a WDM add/drop ring for the network nodes separated by more than about 2km
and a SDM add/drop ring for nodes that are closer to each other. Both rings are duplicated
in hardware, so that the CPNs are less vulnerable to failures. Data is sent in both rings: the
clockwise (CW ring) and the counter-clockwise ring (CCW ring). A WDM ring is composed
of only one optical bre whereas an SDM ring has as many optical bres as nodes in the
ring. The Low End Nodes (LENs) of the rings are denoted by LEW for the WDM ring and
by LES for the SDM ring. Each LEW node, whose structure is shown at Figure 12(a), has
two transmitters and two receivers because of the double ring.
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Here we consider only the WDM part of the CPNs for two reasons:
(i) it is the technology that will be used in future optical networks and
(ii) these are the rings where the failures are the most dicult to be localized because of the
higher number of channels interrupted by a single failure and the resulting increase of the
number of alarms.
The management of the COBNET network is done hierarchically: a global manager controls all
CPNs and interacts with the CPN entities. The CPN entities act as agents when they receive
commands from the global manager, and as managers when they interact with the node agents.
The node agents interact with the micro-controllers at each board. The fault management can be
done either at the CPN level or at the global manager level. The manager receives alarms from all
the elements of its management area and has to identify the failure(s). Once the global manager
has this result, it forwards it to the Human Manager so that the testing phase can begin.
In order to apply our algorithm to the COBNET network, the CPN has been modeled as the
interconnection of network elements through a protected WDM ring. The structure and modeliza-
tion of the LENs are the same as the local nodes of the previous example (Figure 12(a) and (b))
where x is now the ring identier and the third digit is the node identier (instead of 0 as in the
local nodes of the meshed network). The internal structure of the HEN and its modelization as
interconnection of components are shown in Figure 15. The four digits identiers are: the rst digit
gives the class of element, the second digit x is the ring identier and the combination of digits
third and fourth is the identication of the component within the node where y is the connected
node identier to this HEN.
The overall network with the ring topology that we have considered is presented in Figure 16.
Thanks to the double ring structure, the established connections in the network are not interrupted
if there is a failure. The protection mechanism works as follows. Let us consider a bidirectional
communication between LENs Nodes (1 4) and (2 2). The protection switch (PS) at each node is
set at the clock position by default. In this case, the two paths for the two unidirectional channels
(Ch #1 and CH #1') are:
Ch #1 from LEN (1 4) to LEN(2 2): LEN(1 4)-LEN(1 5)-HEN1-HEN2-LEN(2 1)-LEN(2 2)
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Figure 16: Optical network with 5-node protected rings
Channel Input Node Output Node Channel Input Node Output Node
Ch #1 (1 4) (2 2) Ch #1' (2 2) (1 4)
Ch #2 (2 1) (1 3) Ch #2' (1 3) (2 1)
Ch #3 (1 2) (2 3) Ch #3' (2 3) (1 2)
Ch #4 (1 1) (1 5) Ch #4' (1 5) (1 1)
Ch #5 (2 4) (2 5) Ch #5' (2 5) (2 4)
Table 6: Established channels
Ch #1' from LEN(2 2) to LEN(1 4): LEN(2 2)-LEN(2 3)-LEN(2 4)-LEN(2 5)-HEN2-HEN1-
LEN(1 1)-LEN(1 2)-LEN(1 3)-LEN(1 4)
If the LEN stops receiving signal from the CW ring, its PS switches and receives the signal
from the CCW ring so that the channel is not interrupted. Following the example, if the bre (0
1 1 2) between LEN(1 1) and LEN(1 2) breaks, the PS at LEN(1 4) will switch to the CCW ring
so that the return path of Ch #1 will become:
From LEN(2 2) to LEN(1 4): LEN(2 2)-LEN(2 3)-LEN(2 4)-LEN(2 5)-HEN2-HEN1-LEN(1
5)-LEN(1 4)
Even if the connection is restored and no data is lost, the failure has to be localised and repaired.
We have studied dierent failure scenarios considering the unidirectional channels presented at
Table 6.
Each bi-directional connection (node a-node b) is considered as two unidirectional channels Ch
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#x and Ch #x' where the former is the direct path (from node a to node b) and the latter is the
reverse path (from node b to node a). There are 10 established channels that are the C input of
the AFA. The channel paths are the following are presented in Appendix 2.
Several scenarios has been considered:
Failure of an optical bre : Scenario 1 considers the hardware failure of the Optical Fibre (0 1
2 3), as presented in Subsection 2.4.1. In this case, four channels are interrupted Ch #1', Ch
#2, Ch #3, Ch #4 and restored thanks to the PS. Twelve alarms are sent to the manager:
(2 1 4 1)(2 1 5 4)(2 1 4 4)(2 1 3 1)(2 1 4 3)(2 1 0 6)(2 1 3 3)(2 1 3 4)(2 1 0 4)(2 1 5 1)(2 1
0 5) and (2 1 5 3). The solution of the algorithm presents as perfect matching (m=0 ) the
optical bre that connects LEN(1 2) with LEN(1 3).
Two simultaneous failures : Scenario 2 considers two simultaneous failures in two dierent
optical bres: (0 1 2 3) and (0 1 0 6). In this case, the alarms related to both failures reach
the manager simultaneously and intermingled. The manager receives a total of 21 alarms.
The failures are well identied, with SC being the two sets: ((0 1 2 3) and (0 1 0 6)) or ((0 1
2 3) and (0 1 0 3)) for a perfect matching m=0. The algorithm can not distinguish between
(0 1 0 6) -Optical Fibre- and (0 1 0 3) -Demultiplexer- because they are two consecutive
passive components with no active component between them to give more information to the
manager (same case than Scenario 1 of ARPA2).
Two simultaneous failures with lost alarm : Scenario 3 studies the two previous simultane-
ous failures but considering the existence of a lost alarm. In this scenario the alarms related
to both failures also reach the manager simultaneously and mixed but there is one that get
lost. Giving m=2, the AFA result is also ((0 1 2 3) and (0 1 0 6)) or ((0 1 2 3) and (0 1 0
3)), which are the best candidates since they achieve the lowest mismatching value.
Two simultaneous failures with false alarm In this fourth scenario we studied the behaviour
of the AFA when a false alarm is generated. Having the same double failure as in Scenario
2, the received alarms at the manager level are the same 21 alarms and the alarm from (2 1
5 4). In this scenario, the AFA result is also ((0 1 2 3) and (0 1 0 6)) or ((0 1 2 3) and (0 1 0
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Scenario no. of alarms Involved channels Results
Scenario 1 12 Ch #1', Ch #2, Ch #3, Ch #4 O. F.(0 1 2 3)(m=0)
Scenario 2 21 Ch #1, Ch #1', Ch #2, Ch #2',
Ch #3, Ch #4, Ch #4'
O. F. (0 1 2 3) and (0 1 0 6)(m=0)
Scenario 3 20 Ch #1, Ch #1', Ch #2, Ch #2',
Ch #3, Ch #4, Ch #4'
O. F. (0 1 2 3) and (0 1 0 6)(m=1)
Scenario 4 22 Ch #1, Ch #1', Ch #2, Ch #2',
Ch #3, Ch #4, Ch #4'
O. F. (0 1 2 3) and (0 1 0 6)(m=1)
Table 7: Testing results
3)), which are the best candidates since they achieve the lowest mismatching value 1 which
corresponds to the unexpected alarm.
Vague result : In this scenario 5 we considered that they were established only Ch #1, Ch #2
and Ch #3. After a simulated failure, the manager received 9 alarms coming from: (2 1 4
1)(2 1 3 4)(2 1 2 3)(2 1 4 4)(2 1 3 3)(2 1 2 1)(2 1 4 3)(2 1 3 1)(2 1 2 4). In this case the result
of the AFA is weak because it gives three possible components: (0 1 0 1)(0 1 0 4)(0 1 1 2).
A possible solution is to establish a ghost channel such that involves the node in the failure
domain so that the manager will have extra alarms with their information and the AFA will
be able to locate the failure better. In this case, considering as ghost channel the one going
from LEN(1 1) to LEN(1 1) the new alarms will be (2 1 1 1)(2 1 1 4)(2 1 1 3) and the new
AFA result with perfect matching is: (0 1 1 2)
5 Conclusion
We have studied the components of a real optical network and their behaviour when a failure
occurs. We have modelized as a rst step for the Alarm Filtering Algorithm (AFA), an optical
network as relations between classes. We have developed and implemented an AFA to localise
failures in an optical network using WDM techniques. This algorithm allows to locate multiple
failures, and to have both passive elements, which cannot send alarms to the manager, and active
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elements, which can send alarms. It requires a minimal amount of information as input, namely
the established channels in the network, and the origin and type of alarms. No knowledge of the
network topology or of failure probabilities is needed. The output of the algorithm is the set of
subsets containing the most likely elements that may have failed and have prompted the alarm
messages received by the manager. The more channels are established in the network, the easier
it gets to locate the failure(s) because the amount of information that the manager receives due
to the failure(s) is larger. Finally, the application of the AFA has been implemented in Java and
its application to two dierent network topologies has been described: an ARPA2 meshed network
and the European ACTS project COBNET network.
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7 Appendix 1: Established channels at the meshed network
Ch #1: (0 2 0 0)(1 2 0 1)(3 2 0 18)(0 2 1 0)(0 0 2 8)(0 8 0 2)(2 8 18 1)(2 8 18 2)(2 8 18 3)(1 8 0
1)(3 8 0 18) (0 8 1 0)(0 0 8 10)(1 10 0 1)(0 0 10 15)(0 15 0 10)(2 15 18 1)(2 15 18 2)(2 15 18 3)(1
15 0 1)(3 15 0 18)(0 15 1 0) (0 0 15 16)(0 16 0 15)(2 16 18 1)(2 16 18 2)(2 16 18 3)(1 16 0 1)(3 16
0 18)(0 16 1 0)(0 0 16 18)(1 18 0 1) (2 18 0 1)(2 18 0 4)(2 18 0 3)(0 18 0 0)
Ch #2: (0 12 0 0)(3 12 0 5)(1 12 0 1)(0 0 12 13)(0 13 0 12)(2 13 12 1)(2 13 12 2)(2 13 12 3)(1
13 0 1) (3 13 0 20)(0 13 1 0)(0 0 13 14)(1 14 0 1)(0 0 14 15)(0 15 0 14)(2 15 20 1)(2 15 20 2)(2 15
20 3)(1 15 0 1) (3 15 0 20)(0 15 1 0)(0 0 15 16)(0 16 0 15)(2 16 20 1)(2 16 20 2)(2 16 20 3)(1 16 0
1)(3 16 0 20)(0 16 1 0) (0 0 16 18)(1 18 0 1)(0 0 18 20)(1 20 0 1)(2 20 0 1)(2 20 0 4)(2 20 0 3)(0
20 0 0)
Ch #3: (0 3 0 0)(1 3 0 1)(3 3 0 21)(0 3 1 0)(0 0 3 6)(0 6 0 3)(2 6 21 1)(2 6 21 2)(2 6 21 3)(1
6 0 1)(3 6 0 21) (0 6 1 0)(0 0 6 11)(1 11 0 1)(0 0 11 16)(0 16 0 11)(2 16 21 1)(2 16 21 2)(2 16 21
3)(1 16 0 1)(3 16 0 21)(0 16 1 0) (0 0 16 18)(1 18 0 1)(0 0 18 20)(1 21 0 1)(0 0 20 21)(1 21 0 1)(2
21 0 1)(2 21 0 4)(2 21 0 3)(0 21 0 0)
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Ch #4: (0 1 0 0)(3 1 0 5)(1 1 0 1)(0 0 1 2)(0 2 0 1)(2 2 1 1)(2 2 1 2)(2 2 1 3)(1 2 0 1)(3 2 0
14)(0 2 1 0) (0 0 2 8)(0 8 0 2)(2 8 14 1)(2 8 14 2)(2 8 14 3)(1 8 0 1)(3 8 0 14)(0 8 1 0)(0 0 8 9)(1
9 0 1)(0 0 9 12)(1 12 0 1) (0 0 12 13)(0 13 0 12)(2 13 14 1)(2 13 14 2)(2 13 14 3)(1 13 0 1)(3 13 0
14)(0 13 1 0)(0 0 13 14)(1 14 0 1) (2 14 0 1)(2 14 0 4)(2 14 0 3)(0 14 0 0)
Ch #5: (0 8 0 0)(1 8 0 1)(3 8 0 15)(0 8 1 0)(0 0 8 10)(1 10 0 1)(0 0 10 15)(0 15 0 10)(2 15 15
1)(2 15 15 2) (2 15 15 3)(1 15 0 1)(0 15 0 0)
Ch #6: (0 11 0 0)(3 11 0 5)(1 11 0 1)(0 0 11 16)(0 16 0 11)(2 16 11 1)(2 16 11 2)(2 16 11 3)(1
16 0 1)(3 16 0 17) (0 16 1 0)(0 0 16 15)(0 15 0 16)(2 15 17 1)(2 15 17 2)(2 15 17 3)(1 15 0 1)(3 15
0 17)(0 15 1 0)(0 0 15 14) (1 14 0 1)(0 0 14 13)(0 13 0 14)(2 13 17 1)(2 13 17 2)(2 13 17 3)(1 13 0
1)(3 13 0 17)(0 13 1 0)(0 0 13 17) (1 17 0 1)(2 17 0 1)(2 17 0 4)(2 17 0 3)(0 17 0 0)
8 Appendix 2: Established channels at the COBNET net-
work
Channel1: (0 1 4 0)(3 1 4 5)(1 1 4 1)(0 1 4 5)(1 1 5 1)(0 1 0 6)(0 1 0 3)(2 1 0 1)(2 1 0 2)(2 1 0
3)(1 1 0 1)(3 1 -2 4)(0 1 -2 1)(0 0 1 2)(0 2 -1 2)(2 2 -1 2) (2 2 -1 1)(1 2 0 1)(3 2 0 2)(0 2 0 1)(0 2 0
4)(1 2 1 1)(0 2 1 2)(1 2 2 1)(2 2 2 1)(2 2 2 4)(2 2 2 3)(0 2 2 0)
Channel1': (0 2 2 0)(3 2 2 5)(1 2 2 1)(0 2 2 3)(1 2 3 1)(0 2 3 4)(1 2 4 1)(0 2 4 5)(1 2 5 1)(0 2
0 6)(0 2 0 3)(2 2 0 4)(2 2 0 5)(2 2 0 6)(1 2 0 1)(3 2 -1 2) (0 2 -1 1)(0 0 2 1)(0 1 -2 2)(2 1 -2 4)(2 1
-2 3)(1 1 0 1)(3 1 0 4)(0 1 0 1)(0 1 0 4)(1 1 1 1)(0 1 1 2)(1 1 2 1)(0 1 2 3)(1 1 3 1)(0 1 3 4)(1 1 4
1) (2 1 4 1)(2 1 4 4)(2 1 4 3)(0 1 4 0)
Channel2: (0 2 1 0)(3 2 1 5)(1 2 11 )(0 2 1 2)(1 2 2 1)(0 2 2 3)(1 2 3 1)(0 2 3 4)(1 2 4 1)(0 2
4 5)(1 2 5 1)(0 2 0 6)(0 2 0 3)(2 2 0 1)(2 2 0 2)(2 2 0 3)(1 2 0 1) (3 2 -1 1)(0 2 -1 1)(0 0 2 1)(0 1
-2 2)(2 1 -2 2)(2 1 -2 1)(1 1 0 1)(3 1 0 3)(0 1 0 1)(0 1 0 4)(1 1 1 1)(0 1 1 2)(1 1 2 1)(0 1 2 3)(1 1 3
1)(2 1 3 1) (2 1 3 4)(2 1 3 3)(0 1 3 0)
Channel2': (0 1 3 0)(3 1 3 5)(1 1 3 1)(0 1 3 4)(1 1 4 1)(0 1 3 5 )(11 5 1)(0 1 0 6)(0 1 0 3)(2 1
0 7)(2 1 0 8)(2 1 0 9)(1 1 0 1)(3 1 -2 3)(0 1 -2 1)(0 0 1 2) (0 2 -1 2)(2 2 -1 6)(2 2 -1 5)(1 2 0 1)(3 2
0 1)(0 2 0 1)(0 2 0 4)(1 2 1 1)(2 2 1 1)(2 2 1 4)(2 2 1 3)(0 2 1 0)
Channel 3: (0 1 2 0)(3 1 2 5)(1 1 2 1)(0 1 2 3)(1 1 3 1)(0 1 3 4)(1 1 4 1)(0 1 4 5)(1 1 5 1)(0 1
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0 6)(0 1 0 3)(2 10 4)(2 1 0 5)(2 1 0 6)(1 1 0 1)(3 1 -2 2) (0 1 -2 1)(0 0 1 2)(0 2 -1 2)(2 2 -1 4)(2 2
-1 3)(1 2 0 1)(3 2 0 3)(0 2 0 1)(0 2 0 4)(1 2 1 1)(0 2 1 2)(1 2 2 1)(0 2 2 3)(1 2 3 1)(2 2 3 1) (2 2 3
4)(2 2 3 3)(0 2 3 0)
Channel 3': (0 2 3 0)(3 2 3 5)(1 2 3 1)(0 2 3 4)(1 2 4 1)(0 2 4 5)(1 2 5 1)(0 2 0 6)(0 2 0 3)( 2
2 0 7)(2 2 0 8)(2 2 0 9)(1 2 0 1)(3 2 -1 3)(0 2 -1 1)(0 0 2 1)(0 1 -2 2)(2 1 -2 6)(2 1 -2 5)(1 1 0 1)(3
1 0 2)(0 1 0 1)(0 1 0 4)(1 1 1 1)(0 1 1 2)(1 1 2 1)(2 1 2 1)(2 1 2 4)(2 1 2 3)(0 1 2 0)
Channel 4 : (0 1 1 0)(3 1 1 5)(1 1 1 1)(0 1 1 2)(1 1 2 1)(0 1 2 3)(1 1 3 1)(0 1 3 4)(1 1 4 1)(0 1
4 5)(1 1 5 1)(2 1 5 1)(2 1 5 4)(2 1 5 3)(0 1 5 0)
Channel 4' : (0 1 5 0)(3 1 5 5)(1 1 5 1)(0 1 0 6)(0 1 0 3)(2 1 0 10)(2 1 0 11)(2 1 0 12)(1 1 0
1)(3 1 0 1)(0 1 0 1)(0 1 0 4)(1 1 1 1)(2 1 1 1)(2 1 1 4)(2 1 1 3)(0 1 1 0)
Channel 5 : (0 2 4 0)(3 2 4 5)(1 2 4 1)(0 2 4 5)(1 2 5 1)(2 2 5 1)(2 2 5 4)(2 2 5 3)(0 2 5 0)
Channel 5' : (0 2 5 0)(3 2 5 5)(1 2 5 1)(0 2 0 6)(0 2 0 3)(2 2 0 10)(2 2 0 11)(2 2 0 12)(1 2 0
1)(3 2 0 4)(0 2 0 1)(0 2 0 4)(1 2 1 1)(0 2 1 2)(1 2 2 1)(0 2 2 3)(1 2 3 1)(0 2 3 4)(1 2 4 1)(2 2 4 1)(2
2 4 4)(2 2 4 3)(0 2 4 0)
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